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Can Market and Voting Institutions
Generate Optimal Intergenerational
Risk Sharing?
Antonio Rangel and Richard Zeckhauser
We study economies confronted with generational risks. Such risks are
shocks that aﬀect all the members of a generation but have a smaller eﬀect
on other generations. They include the risk of having a bear market during
the years one saves for retirement, being the age cohort that goes oﬀ to an
extended war, or having one’s prime employment years during a recession.
With signiﬁcant shocks of this sort, there are substantial beneﬁts to inter-
generational risk sharing. For example, young generations could insure
the elderly against inadequate stock market performance. Indeed, pre-
cisely this risk-sharing measure has been discussed in the current debate
on social security reform.
The central question of this paper is, Can market institutions or govern-
ment actions generate eﬃcient intergenerational risk sharing? Both mar-
kets and governments have the potential to promote risk sharing, markets
through the trade of ﬁnancial instruments, governments through social
insurance programs. Each has potential on the intergenerational front
since there are ﬁnancial instruments that last for many generations and
some social insurance programs, such as social security or subsidized ed-
ucation, transfer resources across generations. However, our analysis
dashes hopes. We show that markets have problems generating optimal
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113insurance and that self-interested voters may defeat government eﬀorts to
overcome market failures.
We use a simple endowment economy with uncertainty and overlapping
generations to study the problem of intergenerational risk sharing. Each
period there is uncertainty about the size of the aggregate endowment and
its distribution between young and old. To see the role for intergenera-
tional risk sharing, consider an extreme example in which the entire en-
dowment goes either to the young or to the old. Absent a risk-sharing
arrangement, agents consume nothing half the time, a woefully bad out-
come. By contrast, a contingent claim or government program that trans-
fers resources from young to old when the old get nothing, and vice versa,
increases the welfare of every generation.
Optimality is a straightforward concept in deterministic economies but
not in stochastic economies with overlapping generations. In the latter, at
least two notions of optimality are frequently used: ex ante and interim
eﬃciency. Both deﬁne Pareto improvements in the standard way—“a pol-
icy is Pareto improving if, and only if, it improves someone’s welfare with-
out hurting anyone else”—but diﬀer on what the word anyone means. For
the proponents of ex ante eﬃciency, identity is given solely by time of
birth. Thus, an individual born in a given period but in two diﬀerent states
of the world is the same person. The advocates of interim eﬃciency dis-
agree. For them, identity is given by time of birth and state of the world
at birth. In the interim view, every generation has many diﬀerent incarna-
tions, and a policy can be Pareto improving only if it does not decrease
the welfare of any of them. Many results in the literature on intergenera-
tional risk sharing hold for one notion of optimality but not the other.
Not surprisingly, there is spirited intellectual debate about which criterion
is appropriate. We sidestep this debate and, like the rabbi in many a story,
declare both sides correct. In particular, we show that both markets and
voting institutions have diﬃculties generating desirable outcomes whether
judged by ex ante or interim eﬃciency.
We start the analysis by establishing, as a benchmark, the intergenera-
tional transfers that yield eﬃcient outcomes. Clearly, eﬃcient risk sharing
would be achieved if a disinterested social planner orchestrated the trans-
fers. But such a ﬁgure, however often invoked in economics, is chimeri-
cal. Eﬃcient risk sharing will emerge only if it is generated endogenously
by the institutions in our society. In other words, to determine what risk
spreading will take place, we need to examine the intergenerational trans-
fers that will be generated by markets and governments.
Among the market’s ﬁner achievements is its ability to spread risks in
static economies. Financial assets, derivatives, and contingent claims are
among the instruments that markets deploy as they reallocate risks to
those who can bear them most cheaply. Should not such instruments, at
least if the asset structure is rich enough, be able to spread risks optimally
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are born, they cannot buy ex ante insurance. The aspiration level for mar-
kets is at best interim eﬃciency. Unfortunately, even this far lower hurdle
presents problems. To understand why, it is useful to study markets with
varying asset structures.
First, consider an economy with contingent commodities. Within it,
agents facing the risk of a stock market collapse could insure themselves
by purchasing contingent claims that pay oﬀ only given that eventuality.
They could ﬁnance these purchases by selling contingent claims that pay
oﬀ when the stock market booms. These trades provide valuable insurance
because they shift consumption from high- to low-consumption states.
However, with overlapping generations, trade takes place sequentially, and
agents can trade only with coexisting generations, who face similar risks.
As a result, these valuable trades do not take place.
Next, add an inﬁnitely lived asset to this economy. The asset, call it
money, pays no dividends and oﬀers no consumption value. Inﬁnitely lived
assets are important because they generate intergenerational transfers
when traded at positive prices. If prices ﬂuctuate in the right way, these
transfers even have the potential to generate eﬃcient risk sharing. In fact,
money generates interim eﬃcient insurance in some, although not all,
economies. Positively priced money generates backward transfers, those
from young to old. Forward transfers can arise only if money trades at a
negative price. But, in equilibrium, the price of money can never be nega-
tive since the older generation could simply destroy it rather than sell it.
Thus, money can provide eﬃcient risk sharing only when backward trans-
fers are what is required. Unfortunately, many interesting generational
risks, such as stock market risk, sometimes require transfers from old to
young. Here, eﬃcient risk sharing has the young help the old when the
market drops but lets the young participate in the gains when the market
booms.
Finally, consider an economy with a market mechanism that can gener-
ate forward transfers. This mechanism is a voluntary scheme in which each
generation makes voluntary contributions during its youth and receives,
as payoﬀs in old age, the contributions of the next young generation.1 Such
an asset could be run by any inﬁnitely lived institution and is in spirit an
intergenerational Ponzi scheme. Here, unlike the case of money, nothing
“real” is exchanged. Yet the two assets are extremely similar. Agents are
willing to provide (invest in) them only if they believe that future genera-
tions will do the same. Since money pays no dividends and has no con-
sumption value, agents will buy it only when they believe that their succes-
sors will do the same. Thus, there is always an equilibrium in which money
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1. As far as we know, Demange and Laroque (1999) is the ﬁrst publication describing
this mechanism.has no value. Similarly, in the voluntary scheme, there is an equilibrium
with zero contributions. In both cases, the value of the asset depends on
self-fulﬁlling expectations. The only diﬀerence between them is that the
voluntary system can generate negative contributions and thus forward
transfers. As a result, with a voluntary pay-as-you-go mechanism, there is
always an equilibrium that yields interim eﬃcient risk sharing. However,
as we argue later in the paper, this equilibrium is unlikely to arise.
These three institutions—contingent commodities, inﬁnitely lived as-
sets, and voluntary transfer mechanisms—represent the archetypal mar-
ket structures that might generate eﬃcient risk sharing. Since none of
them works in all cases, it is natural to ask whether government policy can
ride to the rescue. Obviously, a government acting as social planner could
help by carrying out the transfers required for optimality. The govern-
ment, after all, does have the power to transfer income across generations
and thereby share risks eﬃciently. But the government’s objectives are de-
termined by political pressure, not by an innate desire to correct ineﬃ-
ciencies. Thus, the only interventions that are feasible are those that are
desired by a majority of the voters.
A government with the power to carry out transfers between genera-
tions could use this power to implement optimal generational risk sharing.
But it could also use it to carry out a selﬁsh, purely redistributional policy.
Voters, young and old, might choose to stick with the eﬃcient risk-sharing
rule, but they might vote to expropriate the other generation instead. Since
old citizens die at the end of the period, they always favor imposing a big
redistributive tax on the young. For example, even if the stock market
boomed, they might favor taxing the young and, if in the majority, might
vote that policy.
The young have diﬀerent incentives, which may lead them to behavior
that at least has a nobler cast. There are equilibria in which, even though
they are in political control, the young implement an optimal risk-sharing
rule that requires transfers to the elderly. They ascribe to what we label the
golden transfer policy: transfer unto your predecessors as you would have
your successors transfer unto you. Not only do the young refrain from
expropriating the elderly, but they give actual transfers because they want
to get equivalent transfers from the next generation of young voters. Thus,
if the median voter is always young, as such a voter might be with consis-
tent population growth, equilibria can readily emerge that oﬀer eﬃcient
ex ante risk sharing, even when the immediate interest of the median voter
would be to defect, indeed, to impose transfers in precisely the opposite di-
rection.
Our applause should be restrained, however, since there is always an-
other equilibrium at which the generations ignore risk-sharing considera-
tions and expropriate each other to the extent that voting power and the
Constitution allow. In this case, every generation is worse oﬀ than it would
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transfers were possible.
The formal conclusions of this paper are dreary. The real world oﬀers a
somewhat brighter picture since the story of intergenerational overlap on
which we rely is extreme, with lives lasting but two periods. If agents were
to live for, say, seventy-ﬁve or more periods, both market and voting insti-
tutions would accomplish considerably more risk sharing. With just three-
period lives, the young and the middle-aged generations can insure each
other against the next period’s risk since they will then be alive together.
For example, the young might sell contingent claims against a stock mar-
ket plunge, receiving in return some claims in case of boom. As overlaps
expand, the market’s performance improves, although full eﬃciency re-
mains out of reach. Longer life spans will also tend to lure voters more to-
ward cooperative behavior and less toward expropriation. Other features
of the political landscape, for example, nongenerational concerns or risk
sharing within generations, also have the ability to temper generational
ruthlessness.
We conclude this introduction by relating our work to the existing litera-
ture. The main contribution of this paper is to take both market and politi-
cal institutions seriously. There is a series of papers (see Bohn 1998; En-
ders and Lapan 1982; Fisher 1983; Gale 1994; Green 1977; Gordon and
Varian 1988; and Smith 1982) that describe a range of circumstances un-
der which market institutions produce insuﬃcient risk sharing and thus
leave open a role for Pareto-improving government interventions. Some
of these papers use more realistic models of the economy, but, unlike ours,
they do not study whether institutions that might overcome the ineﬃ-
ciency are feasible.
Obviously, our approach is also related to the literature on monetary
equilibria in stochastic economies (see, e.g., Demange and Laroque 1998,
1999; Lucas 1972; Manuelli 1990; Muench 1977; and Peled 1982, 1984).
However, there are important diﬀerences between the two approaches. We
are interested in money as one of several mechanisms that might generate
an optimal sequence of intergenerational transfers. In some sense, we fol-
low a top-to-bottom approach. We ﬁrst characterize the optimal transfers
and then concentrate on speciﬁc institutions that might be able to generate
them. By contrast, this literature follows a bottom-to-top approach. It
considers the speciﬁc case of markets with money and shows that, when-
ever monetary equilibrium in which money trades at positive prices exists,
it yields interim but not ex ante eﬃcient risk sharing. Using our diﬀerent
approach, we show that money can fail to produce suﬃcient risk sharing,
even when interim eﬃciency is the measuring rod.
Section 4.1 presents a model of the economy. Section 4.2 explores what
might be meant by eﬃcient risk sharing between generations. Section 4.3
introduces retirement risk as a speciﬁc form of generational risk, setting
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tions. Section 4.4 spotlights the strengths and vulnerabilities of market
institutions as risk-sharing instruments. Section 4.5 gives parallel treat-
ment to voting institutions. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.1 A Model of the Economy
Consider a simple overlapping-generations economy in which every pe-
riod t  0, 1, 2 ,...,an e wg e n e r a tion t is born and lives for two
periods, t and t  1. To focus on intergenerational risk sharing, suppose
that there is only one agent per generation. Every period agents receive
an endowment that depends on the state of the world . This is a pure
exchange economy, and the endowments cannot be stored. Thus, every
period aggregate consumption equals the aggregate endowment. Let ey(t)
denote the endowment of the young in period t, eo(t) the endowment of
the old, and E(t) the aggregate endowment. The set of states is ﬁnite,
and the endowment process is independently and identically distributed
(i.i.d.), with the probability of  given by ().
Each generation is born after that period’s uncertainty is resolved. This
assumption is important because it implies that young and old cannot
enter into mutually beneﬁcial risk-sharing agreements. After its birth, a
generation faces uncertainty only in old age, and, since only future genera-
tions can insure them against this risk, there are no gains from trading
with the elderly alive at the time.
The preferences of generation t a r eg i v e nb y
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where cy
t and co
t1 denote, respectively, its consumption when young and
in old age. We assume that f is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly concave,
and increasing and satisﬁes limx→0 f(x)  ∞ and limx→0 f(x)  ∞. These
standard properties guarantee interior solutions to the maximization
problems described below. The last two properties indicate a very strong
desire for consumption smoothing since they imply that any amount of
positive consumption in both periods is preferred to an allocation with
zero consumption in either youth or old age.
An allocation is a function that speciﬁes the consumption of young and
old for any possible history of shocks. Given the purpose of our analysis
and the nature of the model, we focus on stationary allocations in which
consumption depends only on the current state of the world. In addition,
feasibility requires that
ccE
yo () () ()   +≤ for all  .
As we will see below, optimal intergenerational risk sharing requires
carrying out intergenerational transfers between young and old that might
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that speciﬁes the transfer from young to old in state ; negative values
indicate transfers in the opposite direction. Clearly, a sharing rule gener-
ates allocations equal to
ceT ceT
yy o o () () () () () () .   =− =+ and
Figure 4.1 gives a graphic representation of the economy that will be
useful later on. The diagram is a variation of the well-known Edgeworth
box. Consider an economy with only two states, high and low. The dimen-
sions of the box are given by the size of the aggregate endowment, the low
state on the horizontal axis, the high state on the vertical axis. A point in
the box denotes how the endowment is distributed between young and old
in each state. (The endowments of the old are measured from the upper-
right-hand corner.) For example, the central point represents a sharing
rule in which young and old always consume the same amounts. Endow-
ments and ﬁnal allocations are denoted by points, risk-sharing rules by
vectors.
4.2 What Is Eﬃcient Risk Sharing?
The goal of this paper is to understand whether market and political
institutions can generate optimal risk sharing. Hence, the analysis starts
with a discussion of optimality. This notion is so widely used in economics
that the reader might ﬁnd it surprising that a discussion is needed at all.
The problem is that, while the concept of optimality is straightforward in
deterministic economies, the same is not true in stochastic models with
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Fig. 4.1 Endowments of old and young in high and low statesoverlapping generations. In fact, at least two alternative notions are fre-
quently (and passionately) used: ex ante and interim eﬃciency. Both deﬁne
Pareto improvements in the standard way—“a policy is Pareto improving
if, and only if, it improves someone’s welfare without hurting anyone
else”—but diﬀer on what the word anyone means. The disagreement is
based on a diﬀerent conception of identity. Is identity given solely by time
of birth, or is it given by time of birth and the state of the world at birth?
In other words, is an agent born in a given period but in diﬀerent states
of the world the same agent? For the proponents of ex ante eﬃciency, he
is. The advocates of interim optimality disagree.
The disagreement carries over to the deﬁnition of optimality:
Definition 1. Ex ante optimality: A stationary allocation c(  ) is ex
ante Pareto optimal if there does not exist another feasible stationary
allocation c(  ) such that for every generation t
   
      ∑∑ ∑∑ ≥
ˆˆ








with strict inequality for at least one generation.
Definition 2. Interim optimality: A stationary allocation c(  ) is in-
terim Pareto optimal if there does not exist another feasible stationary
allocation c(  ) such that for every generation t and every state 
ˆˆ
(ˆ)( () , ( ˆ)) (ˆ)( () , ( ˆ)),









with strict inequality for at least one pair (t, ).
In the ex ante view, since agents are able to compute expected utility
before their birth, well-being is determined by the average welfare of their
diﬀerent incarnations. These averages have no meaning for the proponents
of interim optimality. For them, consciousness and identity cannot pre-
cede birth, and, thus, when an agent is able to evaluate utility for the ﬁrst
time, he incorporates in his calculations all the information that he has at
birth. As a result, he dislikes a policy that may have increased his welfare
ex ante but decreases it in the particular state in which he is born.
An interim Pareto improvement is less likely to exist than an ex ante
one. In the ex ante view, a Pareto improvement can occur when a genera-
tion wins in some incarnations, loses in others, but is better oﬀ on average.
This is not interim Pareto improving, however, because it hurts some in-
carnations. As a result, every ex ante eﬃcient allocation is also interim
eﬃcient, but not vice versa.
Which notion is the correct one?2 Clearly, the answer to this question
2. This question has been the subject of a long debate that started, at least, with the publi-
cation of Lucas (1972). Lucas proposed an ex post notion of optimality in which agents
120 Antonio Rangel and Richard Zeckhausermust be based on the merits of the notion, not on whether market or
political institutions are able to generate that type of optimality. One must
ﬁrst select the optimality criteria and only then study which institutions
are able to generate it.
Peled (1982) argues for interim eﬃciency because it mirrors the infor-
mational structure of the economy. In particular, it assumes that agents
evaluate policy with the same information that they have when they trade
in the market or when they vote: the young generation t knows t but not
t1. By contrast, the informational structure in the ex ante view has the
ﬂavor of a Rawlsian veil of ignorance in which agents evaluate policy be-
fore their birth.
This is a sound argument, but it is not suﬃcient to rule in favor of
interim eﬃciency. If agents could travel out of time and trade before their
birth, with knowledge about when they will be born but not about how
uncertainty will be resolved, they would buy ex ante insurance. Thus,
agents do not insure ex ante because they are technologically constrained
(time travel not having been invented yet). But they would remove the
constraint if they could ﬁnd a way. In this view, the ex ante transfers can
be seen as a way of removing the technological constraint. Agents would
experience the technology as an improvement, and, as a result, they also
view the ex ante transfers as Pareto improving.
Since both eﬃciency notions have signiﬁcant standing and the goal of
this paper is not to advocate for one or the other, we sidestep the debate
by analyzing the risk-sharing properties of institutions under both points
of view. As an added beneﬁt, the reader might ﬁnd that the analysis sheds
light on the diﬀerences between them.
In the rest of this section, we characterize the set of optimal risk-sharing
rules. Let us look ﬁrst at ex ante optimality. The set of ex ante eﬃcient
stationary allocations is given as
max ( ) (ˆ)( () , ( ˆ)),
ˆ  




yo () () ()   +≤ for all  .
The properties of f(  ) imply that the optimal allocation is uniquely deter-
mined by the ﬁrst-order conditions
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know how uncertainty is resolved throughout their lives. This notion is unsatisfactory be-
cause it rules out, by assumption, any gains from insurance. Muench (1977) pointed out
these problems—which Lucas acknowledged in a reply (see Lucas 1977)—and proposed the
ex ante and interim notions as an alternative. In a classic paper, Peled (1982) responded to
Muench by forcefully defending interim optimality. The literature has used ex ante and in-
terim notions ever since.(1) EA EA ′ = ′ − fc fE c
yy ( ( )) ( ( ) ( )),  
which imply the simple risk-sharing rule
cc E
yo
EA EA () () () .   == 1
2
Thus, the ex ante optimal allocation is independent of how the endowment
is distributed between young and old. As we will see in a moment, the
same is true for interim eﬃcient allocations.
Now look at interim optimality. Let 
(1) ,...,
(n) be strictly positive
weights satisfying 
 ()  1. The set of interim eﬃcient stationary alloca-
tions is given by the solution, for all possible weights, to3
(2) max ( ) (ˆ)( () , ( ˆ)),
ˆ  
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Once more, we get that, for each vector of weights 
(  ), the solution is
fully and uniquely characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions
(3) IN IN 
     ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )). ′ = ′ − fc fE c
yy
The diﬀerence between the two sharing rules can be seen in ﬁgure 4.2.
The dotted curve denotes the locus of interim eﬃcient allocations. By con-
trast, the unique ex ante allocation is the point EA lying at the center of
the box. Thus, for every endowment point, there is a unique ex ante eﬃ-
cient risk-sharing rule but many interim eﬃcient ones.
We will see below that institutions have a harder time generating for-
ward transfers, which go from old to young, than backward transfers,
which go from young to old. Thus, it is important to identify the cases in
which forward transfers are needed to restore eﬃciency. Figures 4.3 and
4.4 provide an answer to this question. The diagram in ﬁgure 4.3 can be
used to describe both the economy with endowment e and, by moving
the endowment point around, the class of economies with that aggregate
endowment. As ﬁgure 4.3 illustrates, the optimal ex ante risk-sharing rule
requires a transfer toward EA, regardless of the endowment’s location.
Southwest movements indicate transfers from young to old, whereas
northeast movements indicate forward transfers. We can see that the only
economies in which ex ante eﬃciency can be restored using backward
transfers are those to the northeast of EA. In other words, for a large class
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3. This program yields an ex ante optimal allocation if, and only if, 
()  (). This is
another way of seeing that ex ante eﬃciency implies interim eﬃciency, but the opposite is
not true.of economies, optimal ex ante risk sharing requires the use of transfers
from old to young in at least one state of the world.
In ﬁgure 4.4, we repeat the analysis for the case of interim eﬃciency.
Since the set of eﬃcient allocations has now increased, the problem is less
severe. However, it is still the case that any economy to the southwest of
the optimal locus must employ forward transfers to achieve an eﬃcient
outcome. Thus, as the diagram shows, forward transfers are needed under
either criterion.
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Fig. 4.2 Eﬃcient risk-sharing rules
Fig. 4.3 Transfers that restore ex ante eﬃciencySome of the results below follow from the fact that, in some economies,
optimal risk sharing cannot take place without forward transfers. Clearly,
these results are interesting only if this class of economies is empirically
relevant. So, in practice, when are forward transfers likely to be necessary?
As ﬁgure 4.4 illustrates, a suﬃcient condition is for the old to be signiﬁ-
cantly wealthier than the young in every state of the world. By contrast,
forward transfers are not needed when it is the young who are wealthier,
for example, when the elderly have no endowments in any state. In fact,
some papers rule out the need for forward transfers by concentrating ex-
clusively on the later case. The diﬀerence between our results and those in
the previous literature can be attributed, in large part, to this restrictive as-
sumption.
4.3 Example: Retirement Risk
The possibility of a stock market collapse and its eﬀects on the welfare
of retirees is an important issue in this volume and a prominent example
of generational risks. For this reason, it is useful to look at an example
that focuses precisely on this issue. Suppose that agents have a constant
endowment when young but face uncertainty about their retirement in-
come, which depends on stock market performance over their earning
years. For concreteness, the stock market either collapses (L) or booms
(H), with equal probability. This is represented by the endowment process
ey(L)  ey(H)  2, eo(L)  1, and eo(H)  4. Agents’ preferences are loga-
rithmic.
124 Antonio Rangel and Richard Zeckhauser
Fig. 4.4 Transfers that restore interim eﬃciencyAggregate output ﬂuctuates widely; it is 3 in the low state and 6 in the
high state. Furthermore, all the gains during booms accrue to the elderly,
who also take all the losses during downturns. The eﬃcient ex ante risk-
sharing rule,
TL TH
EA EA and () ( ) , == − 1
2
1
is an intuitive arrangement in which the young insure the elderly against
the downturn, for example, if the stock market collapses and, in return,
the elderly share the windfall from bull markets.
It is worth emphasizing that this insurance arrangement diﬀers signiﬁ-
cantly from the minimum-pension guarantees that are often discussed in
the social security literature. First, this risk-sharing rule is two sided, as
would be expected given that both generations bear risk. Retirees are pro-
tected against retirement risk, but they have to share the gains during
booms. Second, the size of transfers depends on the entire state of the
economy, not just on the performance of the stock market. This is an
important feature because the cost of insuring the elderly depends on the
income of the young. The young can insure the elderly only to the extent
that their income remains relatively high during stock market collapses. In
our example, this condition is satisﬁed; it is reﬂected in the relative size of
the transfers.
This example also illustrates the diﬀerences between ex ante and interim
eﬃciency. In the absence of any insurance arrangements, the expected util-
ity at birth is 1.38 regardless of the state of the economy. The ex ante risk-
sharing rule yields an average expected utility at birth, calculated of course
before the agent is born, equal to 1.50. But agents born in the low state
have only 1.15 units of expected utility. Thus, they are happy to renege on
the insurance arrangement.
4.4 Market Institutions
We have shown that eﬃcient risk sharing requires intergenerational
transfers and characterized the transfers that restore eﬃciency. But a so-
cial planner who could carry them out exists only in the scribblings of
economists. Thus, eﬃcient risk sharing can occur only if the transfers are
generated endogenously by the institutions in the economy. This leads to
the central question of this paper: Are there institutions capable of gener-
ating eﬃcient intergenerational risk sharing? Two types of institutions are
often suggested as possible solutions: markets and government. We study
market institutions in this section and government intervention in the next
and show that both have shortcomings as mechanisms for sharing risks
between generations.
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given a suﬃciently rich asset structure in the economy. Although this intu-
ition holds for static economies and even for dynamic economies with
inﬁnitely lived agents, it fails if there is limited overlap among generations.
There are two reasons for this failure, the ﬁrst straightforward, the second
more subtle. The ﬁrst problem is that agents cannot buy ex ante insurance
since they can trade only after they are born. Thus, the market can provide
at best interim insurance. The second problem presents a challenge even
for this weaker notion of insurance. In an overlapping-generations econ-
omy, trade takes place sequentially. Each period, only the generations alive
at the time can trade with each other. As we will see below, this restricts
dramatically the amount of intergenerational risk sharing that takes place,
even in economies with a rich asset structure.
To understand better the restrictions imposed by sequential trading and
the role that diﬀerent assets play in intergenerational risk sharing, this
section studies three markets with diﬀerent asset structures. First, we study
markets with contingent claims. Next, we add an inﬁnitely lived asset, like
money, that pays no dividends but is sold from one generation to the next.
Finally, we consider a new type of mechanism that resembles a voluntary
pay-as-you-go social security system.
4.4.1 Contingent Claims
Consider an economy in which two types of commodities are exchanged
every period: (1) that period’s consumption good and (2) contingent
claims for next period. Since trading takes place after the uncertainty has
been resolved, prices might depend on the state of the world. Let p( | )
denote the price of contingent commodities in state , where p( ˆ | ) buys
one unit of next period’s consumption if the state of the world turns out
to be  ˆ. We normalize the price of this period’s commodity to 1 so that all
contingent prices are real prices.
The equilibrium in this market is easily characterized. At any positive
price, the elderly demand zero contingent commodities. If they could, they
would sell short since they die at the end of the period and thus can default
on their obligations. But we assume that short selling is not allowed.4 As
a result, there are no intergenerational transfers in equilibrium. The price
of the contingent claims adjusts so that the young demand exactly their
endowment, no claims are exchanged, and no risk sharing takes place.
A young agent born in state  faces the following market problem:
max ( ( )) (ˆ)( ( ˆ)),
ˆ
fc fc
yo   

+ ∑
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4. This assumption is necessary, not only to get results that make sense, but also to get the
existence of equilibrium.subject to
cp c ep e
yo yo () ( ˆ|) ( ˆ)( ) ( ˆ|) ( ˆ).
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for all  .
As we would expect, the price of contingent commodities is high for states
in which the agent gets a poor outcome and low when he does well. For
example, in the case of retirement risk, we get p(L|H)  p(L|L )  1
and p(H|H)  p(H|L )  0.25. At a price of four to one, agents facing
the possibility of a stock market crash would choose no insurance. Thus,
we have obtained the following result:5
Proposition. The market with contingent claims has a unique equilib-
rium in which no intergenerational transfers, and thus no risk sharing,
take place.
One could think that the problem is due to market incompleteness, not
the structure of sequential trading. After all, in our discussion, we in-
cluded only one contingent commodity, whereas Arrow-Debreu markets
have one contingent claim for every possible state and period. That would
be incorrect. The result remains unchanged even if we introduce the entire
set of contingent commodities.
The no-trade result, however, depends crucially on two other assump-
tions of the model. First is the assumption of one (representative) agent
per generation. In a more realistic model with many agents and heteroge-
neity within generations, some trade would occur. However, all the trades
would be between the members of the same generation. No intergenera-
tional trade, and thus no intergenerational risk sharing, would take place.
For this reason, and given the objectives of this paper, studying the one-
agent case imposes no conceptual loss.
A more problematic assumption is that lives last for two periods. In a
more realistic model in which agents live for seventy-ﬁve periods and with
almost an equal number of overlaps, the trading of contingent commodi-
ties generates intergenerational transfers and thus risk sharing. To see why,
consider the natural extension to three-period lives. Here, young and
middle-aged agents face risks during the next period of their lives and can
insure each other using contingent claims. It is natural to conjecture that
the market eﬃciency increases with the number of overlaps and that it
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5. Cass and Shell (1983) obtained a similar result, and Baxter (1989) contains an identi-
cal result.reaches 100 percent in the limit case of inﬁnitely lived agents. As far as we
know, however, this problem has not been solved.
4.4.2 Contingent Claims and Inﬁnitely Lived Assets
Can an inﬁnitely lived asset help overcome the problems that come from
limited generational overlap? Consider an economy that, in addition to
the contingent claims described above, has an inﬁnitely lived asset that
has neither productivity nor consumption value. Following Samuelson’s
(1958) classic paper, we refer to this asset as money. The introduction of
money is valuable in this context because it generates intergenerational
transfers when traded at a positive price and, as long as the prices ﬂuctuate
in appropriate fashion, it even has the potential to provide some intergen-
erational risk sharing.
Let M be the amount of money in the economy and m() its price in
state . Consider the market problem of an agent born in state :
max ( ( )) (ˆ)( ( ˆ)),
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These budget constraints can be rewritten as
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In equilibrium, the following no-arbitrage condition holds in every state :
ˆ
(ˆ|) ( ˆ)( ) .

   ∑ ≤ pm m
Otherwise, agents could make a “proﬁt” by selling m( ˆ) units of contin-
gent claims in each market, using the proceeds to buy money that is used
to service the claims, and keeping the diﬀerence. Thus, in equilibrium, the
budget constraint reduces to
(5) cp c ep e
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the same amount of risk sharing buying contingent commodities. We will
return to this issue later in the section.
Can money generate optimal risk sharing between generations? It has
long been recognized that, since agents can trade only after they are born,
money cannot generate ex ante risk sharing. However, there exists a large
literature in macroeconomics (see, among others, Peled 1982, 1984; Manu-
elli 1990; and Demange and Laroque 1998, 1999) that studies the interim
eﬃciency of monetary economies. These papers study conditions under
which an interim weak ﬁrst welfare theorem (WFWT) can be established.
The ﬁrst welfare theorem (FWT) states that every market equilibrium is
eﬃcient. By contrast, the WFWT holds if there is always a market equilib-
rium that is eﬃcient, even when there are other ineﬃcient equilibria.
It is easily seen that this market institution cannot satisfy the FWT
because there is always an equilibrium with m()  0 for all . In this case,
money might change hands, but no real resources are transferred, and
thus no risk sharing takes place. The problem is that monetary equilibria
depend on expectations. Since money pays no dividends and has no con-
sumption value, agents are willing to buy it only if they believe that they
will subsequently be able to sell it for a positive and proﬁtable price.
However, the problem is even worse.
Theorem. Both the ex ante and the interim WFWT fail for a market
with contingent claims and money as its risk-sharing instruments.
This result derives from a very simple fact. In equilibrium, the price of
money can never be negative. In a state with negative prices, the old would
burn their money rather than sell it. Also, an equilibrium in which m()
 0 for some states and m( ˆ)  0 for some other states cannot exist; that
is because the young would have an inﬁnite demand for money in the ﬁrst
class of states and markets would not clear. We can thus conclude that
money trades at positive prices in any equilibrium that generates intergen-
erational transfers. But this implies that, although money can generate
either no transfers or backward transfers, it can never produce transfers
from old to young. As a result, as ﬁgure 4.4 shows, the interim WFWT
fails because all the economies in the southwest part of the box need for-
ward transfers to restore eﬃciency. In fact, these economies have a unique
equilibrium in which money has no value. Since ex ante eﬃciency implies
interim eﬃciency, this argument also establishes the failure of the ex ante
WFWT.
At face value, this theorem seems to contradict results in the previous
literature that prove that any equilibrium in which money trades at non-
zero prices is interim eﬃcient. But there is no contradiction. As ﬁgure 4.4
shows, the problem is that equilibria with positive money prices might not
exist. In those economies, the market cannot generate even eﬃcient in-
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essary if one assumes that the endowment process is to the northeast of
the interim eﬃcient frontier. This assumption is made in several papers in
the literature.
The failure of the WFWT depends crucially on forward transfers being
necessary for interim eﬃcient risk sharing. Thus, it is important to ask
whether any of our assumptions are essential for this eﬀect. In particular,
one might be suspicious of the lack of an initial period in our economy.
Recall that t  0, 1, 2 ....After all, if the economy is truncated at
t  0, the risk-sharing policy depicted in ﬁgure 4.4 is not interim Pareto
improving. Here, the elderly at time 0 make transfers without receiving
anything in exchange.
To explore this issue, consider a variation of our model in which there
is an initial generation born at time 0, and suppose, as before, that the
endowment process is characterized by a point in ﬁgure 4.4. If the endow-
ment lies to the northeast of the interim frontier, then backward transfers
are enough to restore interim eﬃciency, and the interim WFWT holds.
Thus, suppose that the endowment lies to the southwest of the frontier, the
case that causes problems in our model. The existence of a ﬁrst generation
changes the set of interim eﬃcient allocations. To see why, consider the
lower-left-hand corner of the box, an endowment process in which the el-
derly always get everything. The endowment allocation is interim eﬃcient
in the truncated economy because it gives the maximum feasible con-
sumption to generation 0. Thus, the interim WFWT trivially holds for this
economy. Similarly, we conjecture that the interim WFWT holds for all
the other truncated economies in this region.
It is important to emphasize, however, that interim eﬃciency holds be-
cause the existence of an initial generation makes Pareto improvements
diﬃcult, not because the market is generating the “right” intergenerational
transfers. As before, there are risk-sharing rules that use forward transfers
and make every generation, except the ﬁrst one, better oﬀ. Therefore, the
main insight generalizes to the case of economies with an initial genera-
tion: the interim eﬃcient risk-sharing arrangements that everyone but the
ﬁrst generation favors cannot, in general, be generated by the market.
To understand better the diﬀerences between ex ante and interim insur-
ance, it is useful to revisit the example of retirement risk. Figure 4.5 depicts
the nontrivial monetary equilibrium that arises in this case. Money prices
are m(L)  m(H)  m  0.4435. Thus, the trading of money restores
interim eﬃciency, but it generates constant backward intergenerational
transfers. From the ex ante point of view, this arrangement is quite coun-
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6. Demange and Laroque (1999) allow money to take negative prices, and thus they are
able to obtain a WFWT. The explanation is that their “negative money” resembles more the
voluntary pay-as-you-go system studied in the next subsection than standard ﬁat money.terintuitive. With money, the young always make a transfer to the old,
which insures the old against the possibility of a stock market collapse.
But, in contrast to ex ante risk sharing, the old do not share any of the
gains from a stock market boom. In fact, since
cL m cH m
oo () ( ) , =+ =+ 1
2
4 and
the old end up consuming more in both states of the world.
4.4.3 Voluntary Pay-as-You-Go Mechanisms
The key problem with money as a risk-sharing mechanism is that it
cannot generate forward transfers. In this section, we study a market
mechanism that can. A voluntary pay-as-you-go system is basically an
intergenerational Ponzi scheme in which each generation makes voluntary
contributions during its youth and receives, as payoﬀs in old age, the vol-
untary contributions of the next generation. Such a mechanism could be
run by an inﬁnitely lived institution, for example, the government.
The return from investing in this asset is proportional to the aggregate
contributions of the next generation and inversely proportional to the ag-
gregate contributions of the present generation. Consider the market
problem of an agent born in state .I fw el e t
() denote aggregate contri-
butions, the return on investing one unit is 
( ˆ)/
() when tomorrow’s
state is  ˆ. Thus, the agent solves
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Fig. 4.5 Equilibrium with moneysubject to
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where  is his contribution to the asset. The agent is a price taker, and
thus he takes the “price” of the asset, or, more precisely, the aggregate
contributions, as given.
As in the case of money, agents are willing to invest only if they believe
that future generations will do the same. Thus, there is always an equilib-
rium in which 
()  0 for all  and no risk sharing takes place. This
suggests that money and voluntary pay-as-you-go systems are very similar
assets, even though in the latter case no “commodity” or piece of paper is
exchanged. This is not surprising because the value of both assets depends
on self-fulﬁlling expectations.
A careful examination of the budget constraints (6) and (4) shows that
the two assets are almost identical. To see why, suppose that M  1s o
that there is only one unit of money in the economy. In this case, 	 denotes
the share of the money supply that the agent is willing to hold, and, in
equilibrium, we must have 	1. Similarly, in (6), /
() denotes the
share of contributions that the agent is willing to make, and, in equilib-
rium, 
 (). But this implies that, as long as m() 
 () for all , the
two assets are identical, and we have the following result:
Proposition. If contributions cannot be negative, then there is a one-
to-one correspondence between the equilibria in the market with money
and the equilibria in the market with a voluntary pay-as-you-go mech-
anism.
In common parlance, a market economy with money and a voluntary
pay-as-you-go social security scheme can achieve precisely the same out-
comes. But what if we allow the young generation to extract resources
from the social security scheme rather than pay into it? This enables the
pay-as-you-go scheme to generate the forward transfers that are needed
to restore interim eﬃciency, a capability not available to the market econ-
omy with money:
Theorem. If negative contributions are possible, an economy with a vol-
untary pay-as-you-go mechanism can satisfy the interim WFWT but
not the ex ante one.7
How should we interpret a negative contribution? Strictly speaking, it
is a loan in which the cost of borrowing is determined by the actions of
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7. The proof of this result follows from the analysis of Demange and Laroque (1999).the next generation. Suppose that today’s young generation contributes
T to the system and that the next generation also contributes T. Then
the asset amounts to a loan with an interest rate equal to 1. On the other
hand, the loan is free if the next generation decides to contribute 0.
It is important to emphasize that, with unrestricted contributions, a
generation that buys the asset could ﬁnd itself with an arbitrarily large li-
ability. In a voluntary pay-as-you-go system, the “dividend” that the as-
set pays is determined by the actions of the next generation, which could
decide to borrow an arbitrarily large amount. Of course, such behavior
does not take place in equilibrium because the next generation would do
the same, but such an action is a possibility. This is particularly problem-
atic since, as we saw in (5), in equilibrium the price of the contingent
commodities is such that agents do not have a strict incentive to buy the
asset. So why should they take the risk? Thus, the equilibrium with 
()
 0, and no risk sharing, is more plausible than the equilibrium with
negative prices.
We can conclude that these archetypal market institutions cannot gen-
erate ex ante eﬃcient risk sharing and are unlikely to generate interim
eﬃciency, at least for a large class of economies. Can government policy
come to the rescue?
4.5 Voting Institutions
The government has the power to transfer income across generations
and thus to provide risk sharing. However, its objectives are determined
by political pressure, not by an innate desire to correct ineﬃciencies.Thus,
the problem with government, unlike the market, is not what it has the
power to do but what it is likely to do given its power. In this section, we
characterize the risk-sharing rules that arise as the result of the electoral
process that guides government.
Each period there is an election in which all the agents alive at the time
vote. Although many issues are decided in a typical election, here we
model only the choice of intergenerational redistribution. The policy space
in state  is given by
PT e R T Re
oy () { : () () () () } ,     =− ≤ −≤ ≤ ≤
where T is the transfer from young to old that is implemented in the period
and [R(), R()] are exogenously given constitutional constraints on
intergenerational expropriation. We assume that R()  0  R()s o
that both forward and backward transfers are possible. Clearly, eﬃcient
risk sharing arises only if voters always choose the optimal transfer T*()
that we characterized in section 4.2 above.
Every period the young choose policy with probability  and the old
with probability 1  . We refer to the generation choosing policy as the
Optimal Intergenerational Risk Sharing 133median voter. If 1, the young always choose policy, for example, in an
economy with a rapidly growing population, whereas, if 0, the old
always determine policy, for example, when the old are well organized
politically (e.g., through AARP). The model implicitly assumes that vot-
ers’ preferences are determined by age. Although this assumption is not a
good description of voting behavior for a wide range of issues (e.g., abor-
tion or school prayer), it seems justiﬁed for intergenerational redistribu-
tion, where the eﬀect that the policy has on an agent depends only on his
age (for evidence in this regard, see Poterba [1997]).
Given these assumptions, the voting institution can be modeled as the
following inﬁnitely repeated game:
● Every period t, nature selects t and chooses the identity of the me-
dian voter.
● After observing these outcomes, the median voter chooses a policy pt
 P(t).
● There is complete information about the history of previous policies
and states. History at time t is denoted by
hp p tt t t t = −− −− (..., , ;..., , ).  21 21
● The set of political equilibria is given by the set of sequential equilib-
ria of this game.
Let po(, h) denote the policy that an old median voter selects in state
, given history h. Deﬁne p y(, h) similarly. Strictly speaking, voters have
only one decision to make: how much to transfer between young and old.
However, in order to understand better the politics of intergenerational
risk sharing, it is useful to think of the policy space as having two dimen-
sions:
PI I T R R R R () { : *() ,} { : () () } ,    ⊆= × − ≤ ≤ 0
that is
pT R () { *() ,} () .  =+ 0
The ﬁrst dimension, I  T*(), 0, measures whether the eﬃcient risk-
sharing transfer is taking place. The second dimension, R  [R(),
R()], measures the amount of pure intergenerational redistribution. This
representation emphasizes an important feature of the political process:
once the door is open to carry out transfers between the generations, vot-
ers can choose optimal risk sharing, but they can also choose expropria-
tion. Take, as an example, the case of retirement risk, and suppose that
the median voter is always old. When the stock market collapses, these
voters can tax the young and vote a minimum pension to themselves, as
134 Antonio Rangel and Richard Zeckhausereﬃciency considerations demand. But they can also raise the taxes of the
young in the case of a boom where, following the dictates of ex ante risk
sharing, they are supposed to tax themselves.
The ﬁrst step in analyzing the model is to note that an old median voter
always chooses no risk sharing and maximum redistribution:
(7) ph R
o
t (, ) () .  =
Since the elderly are not aﬀected by future policy, their best option is to
maximize current consumption, and, given the opportunity, they expropri-
ate the young. From their point of view, the choice of taxes is purely about
redistribution, not about risk sharing; after all, they do not face any more
risks. Thus, we can interpret the vote of the elderly as a decision not to
carry out any risk sharing and to expropriate the young as much as pos-
sible. In the expanded version of the game, this can be written as
˜ ( , ) ( , ( )). ph R
o
t  = 0
What about young voters? As was the case with the market, the equilib-
rium of this model depends on the beliefs that present generations have
about the behavior of future generations. There are, thus, two types of
outcomes: Markovian equilibrium, in which no risk sharing takes place,
and non-Markovian equilibrium, with optimal risk sharing.
In a Markovian equilibrium, agents maximize their payoﬀ for the period
because they believe that their actions do not aﬀect the behavior of future
voters. In this case, the young also expropriate as much as possible:
ph R
y
t (, ) () .  =−
As before, we can interpret their vote as a decision to focus purely on
redistributive politics, without any concern for risk sharing (p ˜
y(, ht) 
(0, R())).
We can conclude that, in a Markovian equilibrium, every generation
expropriates the others as much as possible and that the direction of ex-
propriation depends on who ends up as the median voter. It is important
to emphasize that, when there are few constraints on expropriation, for
example, if R()  eo() and R()  ey(), agents are worse oﬀ here than
with generational autarchy, where no risk sharing takes place.
There are also non-Markovian equilibria in which the young voters im-
plement the optimal risk-sharing policy and resist the temptation of ex-
propriating the elderly. Consider, for example, the following strategy:
(8)
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generation has done the same. But, if there is any deviation from this be-
havior, they revert to the short-sighted expropriation strategy (0, R ()).
Cooperation does not depend on the behavior of the old since everyone
knows that they always vote for expropriation. Using strategies of this
type, we can establish the following result:
Theorem. (1) If there are no limits to intergenerational expropriation
(R ()eoandR ()ey()),thentherearepoliticalequilibriainwhich
the optimal (ex ante or interim) risk-sharing rule is implemented when-
ever the median voter is young. (2) Thus, if the median voter is always
young (1), there are equilibria that generate both interim and ex
ante eﬃcient risk sharing. (3) However, regardless of who is the median
voter, there is always an equilibrium in which there is no risk sharing,
and full expropriation takes place.
The proof of this theorem reveals the essence of the problem. As we
discussed above, the elderly always expropriate as much as possible. Thus,
to check that the strategies (7) and (8) are a political equilibrium, we only
need to verify the incentives of the young, who make decisions in two
types of situations: (1) histories in which every previous young generation
followed the eﬃcient risk-sharing policy and (2) histories in which there
was a deviation from this code of behavior.
Consider the ﬁrst case, and suppose that the state of the world is .T h e
young median voter knows that, if the next median voter is old, he will
choose R(). On the other hand, if the next median voter is young, he will
copy the behavior that the young voter chooses today; that is, expropria-
tion will trigger expropriation, whereas optimal risk sharing will maintain
optimal risk sharing. Thus, if the agent chooses T*(), his lifetime payoﬀ
becomes
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On the other hand, if he decides not to cooperate with the risk-sharing
rule, he is better oﬀ expropriating the elderly as much as possible (T 
R () ) ,r e a p i n gap a y o ﬀ equal to
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For  suﬃciently large, the left-hand side is approximately equal to the
interim expected utility8 generated by the risk-sharing policy T*(). By
contrast, the right-hand side gives the payoﬀ, in expected-utility terms, of
the Markovian equilibrium in which every generation expropriates as
much as it can. Without bounds of expropriation, R()  eo() and R()
 ey(), this payoﬀ becomes











So we ﬁnally conclude that the young choose optimal risk sharing over
expropriation since they have a strong desire for consumption smoothing
(limx→0 f (x)  ∞).
Now consider the second type of history. According to (7) and (8),
future voters will ignore the risk-sharing rule and expropriate a coexisting
generation as much as possible. As a result, present voters have no incen-
tive to refrain from expropriation, and they also choose T  R().
An interesting property of the previous equilibrium is that young agents
are willing to implement the optimal ex ante transfer even though they
constitute a majority and vote only after they are born. Since part of the
uncertainty has been revealed, agents might have an incentive to default
from the risk-sharing rule. For example, in the case of retirement risk,
agents born in the low state get a payoﬀ of 1.15 with insurance and 1.38
without insurance. Yet the previous analysis shows that they are willing to
give a transfer to the elderly when the stock market collapses.
In this example, the only reason why young voters are willing to help
the elderly is that failure to do so would trigger an expropriation precedent
that could hurt them in old age. A risk-sharing rule is interim individually
rational if, regardless of the state in which the agent is born, it is better
than the initial endowment. Since the ex ante insurance arrangement is
not interim individually rational, the promise of future insurance is not
enough incentive to go along with it. The required additional incentive is
provided by the possibility of expropriation.
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8. That is, the expected utility conditional on knowing that the state of the world at birth
is .Consider the problem of designing a constitution that speciﬁes the rules
of the political process. Can we modify the rules in a way that makes
optimal risk sharing more likely and rules out the possibility of intergener-
ational expropriation? One important lesson from the previous analysis is
that risk sharing is more likely if the young always choose policy. However,
youth dominance is not enough. Given that the Markovian equilibria al-
ways exist, we are faced with a perverse trade-oﬀ. In order to avoid short-
sighted expropriation, restricting the policy space to something like
PT () { *() ,} ,  = 0
where expropriation might be prohibited through, say, a constitutional
amendment, seems desirable. In this case, each generation can choose only
to implement the optimal transfer or to do nothing; it cannot expropriate.
However, ruling out expropriation could prove detrimental:
Proposition. The voting institution with a restricted policy space
{T*(), 0} and in which the median voter is always young can support
only risk-sharing rules that are interim individually rational. Thus, in
general, it can generate interim but not ex ante eﬃcient risk sharing.
The problem with restricting the policy space is that it supports only
risk-sharing rules that are interim individually rational. A risk-sharing
policy is interim individually rational if it does not decrease the expected
utility of an agent, conditional on knowing the state of the world at birth.
As the case of retirement risk illustrates, in most cases of interest this
condition is not satisﬁed. Thus, we are left with a Hobson’s choice: we can
either go with a restricted policy space, which rules out extreme expropria-
tion but also sacriﬁces ex ante insurance, or go with the unrestricted policy
space, which generates optimal risk sharing and no expropriation in the
good equilibrium but produces disastrous outcomes in the bad one.9
Can government intervention generate eﬃcient intergenerational risk
sharing? The government certainly has on paper the power to carry out
the eﬃcient policy. For example, in the case of retirement risk, it could
help retirees by taxing the young when the stock market crashes and simi-
larly tax the elderly when the market booms. However, our analysis sug-
gests that, as long as government policy is determined by self-interested
citizens’ votes, intergenerational transfers will be driven more by redistrib-
utive politics than by risk-sharing considerations.
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9. The political economy of ex ante insurance is very similar to the political economy of
public investment in future generations. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions to get opti-
mal investment in future generations are explored in detail in Rangel (1998).4.6 Conclusions
Our conclusions are not happy: neither market nor political institutions
can be counted on to generate eﬃcient intergenerational risk sharing. Re-
ality may be less dreary since our stark results follow from the assumption
of two-period lives. As lives extend, overlaps increase, and trade in contin-
gent commodities generates useful risk sharing. Similarly, the incentives
to expropriate diminish with longer lives. Thus, market and voting institu-
tions may do better than in our models, but our main conclusion holds:
neither can be relied on to restore full eﬃciency.
Our analysis here is positive. The goal is to understand whether and
when existing institutional arrangements generate eﬃcient risk sharing.
Although our analysis applies to all generational risks, including wars and
economic declines, in the context of this volume it is important to consider
the implications of our analysis for the current debate on social security
reform.
The ﬁrst implication is that, since markets cannot generate optimal risk
sharing, a system of individual accounts cannot produce an eﬃcient allo-
cation. In a market with a rich-enough asset structure, agents can buy a
lot of insurance against events like a stock market crash, but not perfect
insurance. The size of the eﬃciency loss is an open empirical question.
This ineﬃciency can be corrected only by a government policy that car-
ries out transfers between young and old, with the size and direction of
the transfers depending on the state of the world. Thus, a combination of
private accounts and a contingent pay-as-you-go system, which is able to
transfer income in both directions, in principle dominates the pure pri-
vate system.
But the second major lesson of this paper casts doubt on turning that
potential into reality. The political economy of intergenerational trans-
fers—that is, the fact that generations have to vote for the transfers that
are made—may prevent a politically responsive government from inter-
vening successfully. In some extreme cases, it may impose expropriating
transfers that reduce the welfare of every generation.
It is important to emphasize, however, that the possibility of market
failure does not rule in favor of a purely private approach to social secu-
rity. There are many government policies, besides risk sharing, that redis-
tribute income between generations. Government debt and the choice of
the tax base are two prominent examples. Medicare most directly transfers
to the elderly.10 These dimensions are subject to the same redistributive
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10. Arguably, Medicare should be considered in conjunction with social security as a sig-
niﬁcant transfer program from young to old. Medicare’s trustees project that its expenditures
will compose 6.5 percent of GNP by the middle of the next century.politics that we study in this paper. Thus, intergenerational expropriation
can take place even if the government turns social security over to the
private sector. The same elderly who would use risk sharing to expropriate
the young during a stock market boom can use debt to achieve an identical
goal. This paper shows that government policy may not be able to provide
optimal insurance. It does not show, however, that intergenerational redis-
tribution is higher when the government is involved in social security.
The lessons of our overlapping-generations model for eﬃciency can be
distilled brieﬂy. The risk sharing brought by market institutions is always
welcomed but never suﬃcient. The government has the power to generate
eﬃcient risk sharing, but sometimes that power is deployed insuﬃciently
or perversely.
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Comment Thomas J. Sargent
The Questions
The paper under discussion takes up an important issue from an inter-
change among Muench (1977), Lucas (1977), and Peled (1982): how to
compare consumption allocations in an overlapping-generations economy.
Rangel and Zeckhauser adopt Muench’s proposed ex ante utility measure
for comparing stationary allocations in overlapping-generations econo-
mies. Muench called it ET-PO (equal treatment-Pareto optimality). Equal
treatment means stationarity (people experiencing the same random state
at diﬀerent times receive the same consumption allocation). Muench com-
puted utility “prior to birth” by averaging utilities across all the states into
which a person had a chance of being born.
The alternative to ET-PO is promoted by followers of Lucas (1977) and
Peled (1982), who argued that the nonoptimality often detected by the
ET-PO test has an obvious source in an information advantage of a plan-
ner over the decision makers and that it is too easily used to criticize good
equilibria from a superior vantage point. Lucas (1977, 351) noted that,
“in any general equilibrium model with diﬀerently endowed risk averse
agents, many allocations which are Pareto optimal will not be if pre-
endowment insurance markets are admitted.” Joining the spirit of Lucas’s
remark, Peled formulated the concept of conditional Pareto optimality,
which is based on expected utilities conditioned on the same information
that the agents have when they make decisions. Peled advocated condi-
tional Pareto optimality because it uses an information structure that mir-
rors that possessed by decision makers. Peled went on to show that there
always exists a conditionally Pareto-optimal competitive equilibrium,
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Thomas J. Sargent is the Donald Lucas Professor of Economics at Stanford University, a
senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, and a research associate of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.sometimes with and sometimes without valued ﬁat money (depending
on the parameters). Peled’s model has a stochastic version of Samuel-
son’s (1958) result for nonstochastic overlapping-generations models that
it is possible for a single asset (government debt or ﬁat currency) to
cure a failure of a (nonmonetary) competitive equilibrium to be Pareto
optimal.
Which welfare criterion should we prefer, Muench’s or Peled’s? Rangel
and Zeckhauser are more enthusiastic proponents of Muench’s criterion
than Muench himself. Muench embraced his measure halfheartedly: “I
am not asserting that the ET-PO criterion for optimality is the appropriate
one. It seems to imply that all future generations agree before history be-
gins. How can this be democratically achieved?” (1977, 325). An accom-
plishment of Rangel and Zeckhauser’s is to investigate Muench’s question.
They describe a voting system (a description of a list of voters, a sequence
of voting dates, and a protocol for the objects to be voted on) that can
attain the ET-PO criterion “democratically.” But they seem not to like
their voting system, partly because it has an implementation problem (in
addition to the ET-PO equilibrium, another very bad allocation is also an
equilibrium), partly because the choice set must be speciﬁed to allow bad
out-of-equilibrium outcomes to support good equilibrium outcomes, and
perhaps also partly because it is not democratic from the viewpoint of
old people.
Plan of This Comment
I shall devote most of my Comment to empathizing with Rangel and
Zeckhauser’s sympathy for Muench’s prebirth utility criterion. I would like
to add some empirical ammunition to their case by departing from the
details of their setup while embracing its spirit. I want to reinterpret and
broaden the risks. My reinterpretation of those risks is designed to amplify
the claim that the welfare issue that Rangel and Zeckhauser raise is quanti-
tatively important.
Rangel and Zeckhauser’s Setup
Rangel and Zeckhauser study market and political arrangements in a
pure endowment, doubly inﬁnite (t “starts” at ∞ and “ends” at ∞)
horizon model with overlapping generations of two-period-lived people.
People within a generation have identical endowments and preferences.
Preferences are stationary in the sense that a person born at t  j values
time t  j  k consumption in the same way that a person born at time t
values time t  k consumption. Agents are endowed only with time-dated
goods bearing the same dates that they are alive, and they care only about
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depend on the realization of a single random variable  that takes discrete
values [1,...,n]w h e r ep r o b (  i)  i.
Rangel and Zeckhauser restrict themselves to studying stationary allo-
cations; that is, they depend only on , not on calendar time. They propose
to compare the Pareto eﬃciency of various allocations in terms of two
diﬀerent ideas of what identiﬁes a person. Let v() be the optimum value
function for a young agent born in state . Rangel and Zeckhauser study
welfare measures based on utility comparisons with two possible datings:
(1) the conditional on  or “interim” optimum value v() and (2) the pre-
birth or ex ante optimum value Ev  i iv(i).
By excluding heterogeneity within a generation, Rangel and Zeckhauser
focus on intergenerational risk sharing. To emphasize the potential quanti-
tative signiﬁcance of the substantive issue that they are raising, I prefer to
recast their discussion of the ex ante versus the interim welfare criteria in
another setting, one that highlights intragenerational risk sharing. In Ran-
gel and Zeckhauser’s model, there are diﬀerent types and risks to be
shared only because people are born at diﬀerent phases of the “business
cycle” indexed by . In longer-lived overlapping-generations models, Ran-
gel and Zeckhauser point out that much, if not most, of such risk could
probably be insured by trading a small number of assets. So it seems likely
that the ex ante versus the conditional on type welfare distinction acquires
more quantitative importance if we introduce within-generation heteroge-
neity across types.
Coincident but Heterogeneous Agents
Thus, consider instead the kind of environment to which Lucas alluded
in the quotation reproduced above. Let there be a stable distribution of
types of people, where a type is a permanent attribute that cannot be
controlled and that aﬀects earnings from labor. Even in a standard general
equilibrium model with coincident life spans, the ex ante versus the con-
ditional on type welfare issue arises: welfare comparisons depend on
whether utilities are evaluated before or after types are determined. A
standard (Arrow-Debreu) way to set things up would be to take types as
realized and to permit trading of a complete set of history-dependent
claims to consumption bundles. The coincident lifetime complete markets
model satisﬁes the two fundamental welfare theorems for a welfare crite-
rion based on conditional on type utilities. But, from the prebirth view-
point of “persons” whose types are uncertain, a competitive equilibrium
allocation would be dominated by allocations that get more sharing across
types. Only if agents could trade “before birth” would the welfare theo-
rems hold for this economy.
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Thinking about private arrangements for trading “before birth” re-
quires a model with parents and children. Children cannot trade before
their births, but their parents can and would often want to. Thus, consider
any of a number of conditions that dramatically reduce earnings potential
and that are realized at birth. I believe that private insurance for these
conditions is not sold now. This is curious because many of these condi-
tions are easy to verify and involve no moral hazard. I oﬀer the following
calculations as rough estimates of what such insurance would cost. The
four conditions—autism, cerebral palsy, Down syndrome, and spina bi-
ﬁda—have the following incidences per ten thousand live births in the
United States: 4.5, 20, 12.5, and 5. So take the probability of having one
of them to be .0042. With a stationary population, to purchase an annuity
paying $50,000 per year conditional on a child having one of these disor-
ders would then cost a one-time payment of $4,200 per child.1
My reaction to these ﬁgures is that such insurance seems cheap to pro-
vide. Why does private insurance not exist? Why is it not provided by the
government or at least by the U.S. government?
Prebirth Risk for Workers
In terms of their earnings ability, the low or zero-earnings types of
people just mentioned are extreme values from a distribution of types.
Applied economists have adduced ample quantitative evidence for the im-
portance of types characterized by unobserved abilities that are valued in
the labor market. I shall mention a couple of sources for estimates that
might help give quantitative content to the theoretical welfare distinction.
Of course, because variations of ability in the range that we are now con-
sidering are much harder to disentangle from eﬀort, they are more diﬃcult
to insure through private arrangements. I will return to this point below.
But ﬁrst let me give some numbers.
Evidence from Twins Studies
Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman (1994) present evidence for sub-
stantial labor market-relevant endowment heterogeneity. They use obser-
vations on identical twins to identify the eﬀect of individual-speciﬁc en-
dowments on log earnings. They estimate that 27 percent of the variance
of log earnings from labor is due to variance in individual-speciﬁc endow-
ments. Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman also discuss how some of
these individual eﬀects might be insured through sharing within families
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1. I am capitalizing the per person cost of $210.00 per year at an interest rate of 5 percent
per year.or creating new family links through marriage. In particular, they discuss
whether schooling and marriage serve to attenuate or reinforce the
individual-speciﬁc eﬀects on earnings. They estimate that schooling is al-
located to reinforce, and marriage matches made to attenuate, the
individual-speciﬁc eﬀects.
Fixed Eﬀects in Income Dynamics
Another kind of evidence for heterogeneity comes from the literature
on quantitative long-lived overlapping-generations models. Storresletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (STY) (1998) have constructed a numerical long-lived
overlapping-generations model for analyzing some proposed social se-
curity reforms.2 In their model, agents receive an exogenous stochastic
endowment sequence, which STY choose to match to labor income. (Like
Rangel and Zeckhauser, STY abstract from labor-supply decisions.)
Agents can save in the form of a small number of assets, including physi-
cal capital. Because their model is basically a life-cycle version of a pre-
cautionary savings model, STY want a realistic speciﬁcation of the labor-
income dynamics. To calibrate their model to the contemporary United
States, they use (Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) data on labor
earnings to create a speciﬁcation that captures both (a) the personal labor-
income dynamics and (b) the dispersion of the cross-sectional labor-
income distribution by age of workers. To capture both of these, STY use
a model with ﬁxed eﬀects, that is, diﬀerent types. We can use their esti-
mates to calibrate the importance of “type” in determining labor-income
variance.
Thus, STY use the following transitory-permanent ﬁxed-eﬀects statisti-
cal model for the substantial part of the log of labor earnings uit of the ith
person at age t that cannot be explained by education and various other
control variables:
(1a) uz it i it it =++  ε ,
(1b) zz it it it =+ −  1 .
Here, εit,t, and it are each normally and independently distributed and
with mean zero and variances 2
ε, 2
, and 2
, respectively, and |  |  1.
The model (1) makes uit a mixture of a transitory piece εit, a persistent
piece zit, and a person-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect i. Through precautionary sav-
ings, an individual can self-insure much of the transitory and persistent
components (at least if  is suﬃciently smaller than unity); the ﬁxed eﬀect
cannot be self-insured after birth. Model (1) implies the following covari-
ances:
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2. I thank Amir Yaron for discussing with me aspects of the rough calculations reported
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To initialize (2b), STY assume that var(zi,1)  0.
STY use samples drawn from the PSID to ﬁt the parameters of this




  0, they use these parameters to compute the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of income by age: the theoretically computed cross-sectional disper-
sion (without the ﬁxed eﬀects) increases with age, but for all ages it is
below the actual cross-sectional dispersion of adjusted income uit calcu-
lated directly from the PSID data. This observation impels STY to add
the ﬁxed eﬀect through 2
 and to adjust  to match the cross-sectional
distribution of uit. They attain the parameter values 2
  .326, 2
ε  .005,
2
  .019, .98. With these parameter values, the model roughly repro-
duces the level, upward slope, and curvature of the empirical cross-
sectional income variance-age relation. These estimates of the variances
imply a cross-sectional standard deviation of the log of income for the
youngest workers of .35; this implies that the variance of the level of in-
come is approximately exp(.35)[exp(.35)  1]  .5947. The observed ini-
tial cross-sectional standard deviation of the level of income was $2,100 (in
1968 dollars). (The mean level of income [per adult-equivalent members
ofhousehold]was$3,300.)Thus,togetcomparableunitsfortheSTYstudy,
it is appropriate to multiply their standard deviation by 2,100/.5947 to
convert it into 1968 dollars.
To assess the implication of these parameters for Rangel and Zeckhaus-
er’s issue of ex ante versus conditional evaluation of utility, we can use
STY’s speciﬁcation to compute the variance of the expected present dis-
counted value of exp uit deﬁned as
(3) PV =
−







Here, E is the mathematical expectation with respect to the distribution
generated by process (2). The variance of (3) measures the lifetime labor
income risk faced by an agent before he or she is born. Part of the variance
of (3) comes from the ﬁxed eﬀect i, with the remaining part coming from
chance income variations realized during the lifetime. For STY’s speciﬁ-
cation with R  1.04 and a working life of T  45 years, I compute that
the standard deviation of (3) is $40,500 (in 1968 dollars) and that 69 per-
cent of the variance is due to the ﬁxed eﬀect . A standard deviation of
$40,500 is substantial compared to an estimate of the average present
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STY’s ﬁgures. Thus, the income variance is substantial, as is the fraction
of it due to the ﬁxed eﬀect. The 69 percent portion of the variance due to
the ﬁxed eﬀect would be weighed by Rangel and Zeckhauser’s ex ante
welfare criterion, not by the conditional criterion.
Insurability of Working Types
The diverse individual-speciﬁc eﬀects of “abilities” described in the pre-
vious two sections are not observable and can be inferred only by sophisti-
cated statistical procedures. It is therefore not surprising that the private
market does not oﬀer to insure them. However, at least implicitly, societies
provide social insurance for them through tax and transfer schemes. If we
assume that abilities are equally distributed across countries, after-tax
and -transfer income distributions across countries provide hints about
the variation of the magnitude of the social insurance against realization
of ability. For various countries, table 4C.1 shows 90-10 percentile ratios
for measures of after-tax, after-transfer income. The data are from Smeed-
ing (1998), who reports that the income data include rents and interest
but exclude capital gains and various in-kind transfers. Smeeding conjec-
tures that including in-kind transfers would make less equal countries still
less equal. The ﬁgures in table 4C.1 conﬁrm what is widely known: that
there is substantially more sharing across types in Northern European
countries than in the United States.
Eﬃciency and Equality
Rangel and Zeckhauser’s model and my use of STY’s statistics probably
overstate the case for using the ex ante criterion. It is probably not a good
idea to interpret the ﬁgures presented in table 4C.1 with a model with
exogenous labor income. Work in the tradition of Shavell and Weiss
(1979) points to worthwhile incentives that are sustained by unequal con-
sumption distributions. Shavell and Weiss assume that labor market out-
comes are partly the result of a worker’s hidden actions. In making con-
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Table 4C.1 90-10 Quantile Ratio, After-Tax and -Transfer Personal Income








United Kingdom, 1991 4.67
United States, 1991 5.78sumption outcomes depend on the history of observed labor market
outcomes, Shavell and Weiss’s planner spreads the consumption distribu-
tion over time to reward workers who probably are partly lucky and
probably also taking more productive private actions. Thus, the Shavell-
Weiss unemployment-compensation designer uses risk and the worker’s
aversion to it to manage incentive problems. Wealth distributions that
spread out during time as a way optimally to trade oﬀ risk and eﬃciency
have emerged in a variety of models in this tradition (e.g., Green 1987;
Phelan and Townsend 1991; and Thomas and Worrall 1990). The pure
endowment economies under discussion here do not allow us to think
about this issue.
Welfare Criteria and Transition Issues
Welfare criteria based on conditional versus ex ante expected utility
answer diﬀerent questions and so cannot be evaluated without regard to
the question at issue. Similarly, welfare criteria like Muench’s ET-PO that
compare only stationary allocations address questions like, What kind of
society operating forever according to stationary allocation rules would
you like to be born into? The criteria must be adjusted to answer questions
that by their nature compare nonstationary allocations. Thus, Storeslet-
ten, Telmer, and Yaron (1998) and others in the Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ
(1987) tradition who seek quantitatively to compare alternative proposals
to reform social security arrangements struggle to adopt a welfare crite-
rion that appropriately weighs conﬂicting interests. For evaluating propos-
als to change preexisting arrangements, at a minimum we need an initial
stationary equilibrium, a new terminal one, and a transition path between
them. For analyzing transition issues, the most popular framework within
the Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ tradition is the one-sided inﬁnite-horizon econ-
omy studied by Samuelson and Peled, in which there is an initial old gener-
ation most of whose uncertainties have been resolved and who have enti-
tlements that have to be respected in evaluating welfare. I recommend
reading the paper by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (1998) alongside
Rangel and Zeckhauser’s paper because of how they struggle to get as far
as possible using an ex ante welfare criterion and stationary equilibria to
analyze alternative reform proposals.
References
Auerbach, Alan J., and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ. 1987. Dynamic ﬁscal policy. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Behrman, Jere R., Mark R. Rosenzweig, and Paul Taubman. 1994. Endowments
and the allocation of schooling in the family and in the marriage market: The
twins experiment. Journal of Political Economy 102, no. 6:1131–74.
148 Antonio Rangel and Richard ZeckhauserGreen, Edward J. 1987. Lending and the smoothing of uninsurable income. In
Contractual arrangements for intertemporal trade (Minnesota Studies in Macroe-
conomics, vol. 1), ed. Edward C. Prescott and Neil Wallace. Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1977. Reply to Muench and Polemarchakis and Weiss (1977).
Journal of Economic Theory 15:351–52.
Muench, Thomas J. 1977. Eﬃciency in a monetary economy. Journal of Economic
Theory 15:325–44.
Peled, Dan. 1982. Informational diversity over time and the optimality of mone-
tary equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory 28:255–74.
Phelan, Christopher, and Robert M. Townsend. 1991. Computing multi-period,
information-constrained optima. Review of Economic Studies 58, no. 5:853–81.
Samuelson, Paul. 1958. An exact consumption-loan model of interest with or with-
out the social contrivance of money. Journal of Political Economy 66:467–82.
Shavell, Steven, and Laurence Weiss. 1979. The optimal payment of unemploy-
ment insurance beneﬁts over time. Journal of Political Economy 87 (Decem-
ber): 1347–62.
Smeeding, Timothy M. 1998. U.S. income inequality in a cross-national perspec-
tive: Why are we so diﬀerent? In The inequality paradox: Growth of income dis-
parity, ed. James A. Auerbach and Richard S. Bebous. Washington, D.C.: Na-
tional Policy Association.
Storesletten, Kjetil, Chris Telmer, and Amir Yaron. 1998. The risk sharing implica-
tions of alternative social security arrangements. Carnegie-Mellon University.
Mimeo.
Thomas, Jonathan, and Tim Worrall. 1990. Income ﬂuctuation and asymmetric
information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 51, no. 2:367–90.
Discussion Summary
Henning Bohn made two remarks. First, he stated that the assumption of
stationarity seems very critical in the context of interim eﬃciency: interim
eﬃciency imposes no constraints whatsoever unless one operates in sta-
tionary environments. It seems, therefore, that the sharpness of the results
of the paper hinges crucially on the stationarity assumption rather than
on the eﬃciency concept used. Second, with respect to social security and
policy issues, Bohn noted that, if one looks for some benchmark to judge
diﬀerent policies, then only ex ante eﬃciency would be a useful concept,
especially if the government might aﬀect the allocation (as opposed to
exercises where the only uncertainty concerns the endowment).
Robert King remarked that some discussion of the public ﬁnance liter-
ature on the income tax might be useful: ultimately, a zero marginal tax
rate is optimal, yet very few social institutions implement a marginal tax
rate close to zero. The social security system is apparently one that does.
Second, the ﬁxed-eﬀects coeﬃcient i of Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron
to which the discussant, Thomas Sargent, refers could be the result of
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nisms in this context across individuals, one could be inﬂuencing the in-
centives that parents would have to make such investments.
Following up on King’s remark, Amir Yaron commented on the vari-
ance decomposition of the present value of lifetime income reported in
the Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron paper and referred to by Sargent.
Yaron noted that the fraction of the standard error of lifetime income due
to the ﬁxed-eﬀects term (i) ranges from 0.4 to 0.75, depending on the
empirical procedure. Of course, even the lower bound of these estimates
reveals the importance of individual ﬁxed eﬀects for someone’s lifetime
earnings potential. He agreed with King’s remark about the relevance of
education and therefore of parental investments.
Stephen Ross noted that there is a relation between the choice of eﬃ-
ciency and the choice of a model, going either backward or forward. If one
considers, for example, a model that starts at a particular point, interim
eﬃciency should not be achieved because, while it is possible to tax back-
ward through a suﬃciently high interest rate, one cannot tax forward.
Ross further remarked that he found the concept of ex ante optimality or
equal treatment Pareto eﬃciency disturbing as it treats cohorts to be born
in the remote future in the same way as the generation currently alive. He
stated that he strongly favored attaching a smaller weight to those remote
generations than to the current one. He added that the concept is more-
over politically infeasible.
Zvi Bodie inquired whether the discussant knew why the insurance con-
tracts he mentioned, insuring the risk of being born with illnesses that
adversely aﬀect the lifetime ability to earn income, are not being oﬀered.
He added that moral hazard was presumably not the reason. He concluded
that it might be in the interest of insurance companies to oﬀer these con-
tracts.
Thomas Sargent elaborated on his discussion of the results of Behrman,
Rosenzweig, and Taubman, documenting the importance of substantial
labor market-relevant permanent-endowment heterogeneity. He noted
that these authors also study the covariation of this innate ability with two
other variables, education and marriage. They ﬁnd that education acts to
reinforce innate diﬀerences while marriage dampens them.
In response to the discussions and comments, Antonio Rangel made the
following points. First, he noted that, although he often has strong opin-
ions, this is not the case in the debate on the choice of the eﬃciency con-
cept. The paper studies the performance of institutions under both eﬃ-
ciency criteria without in any way advocating the concept of ex ante
eﬃciency. Second, with respect to Bohn’s comment about the importance
of the stationarity assumption, Rangel clariﬁed that, while the stationarity
assumption is innocuous, modeling time as doubly inﬁnite is crucial for
150 Antonio Rangel and Richard Zeckhauserthe results of the paper. In particular, the absence of any ﬁrst generation
is what drives many of the results, including the disagreement with the
ﬁndings of Peled, as remarked by Sargent.
Finally, Rangel pointed out that the choice between the ex ante and the
interim eﬃciency concept is often trivial, especially in static models. He
gave examples of idiosyncratic or intragenerational risks where taking an
ex post perspective is obviously meaningless. On the contrary, in the model
presented in the paper, considering intergenerational risks instead, the
choice is nontrivial, and both concepts are interesting alternatives.
Richard Zeckhauser noted that no forward or backward altruism is as-
sumed in the model. Agents care only about themselves, except perhaps
for strategic, game-theoretic reasons.
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